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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
this extent, clarification in this area of the law is essential.
Mark B Meyers
MATERNAL PREFERENCE AND THE DOUBLE BURDEN:
BEST INTEREST OF WHOM?
Three years after the plaintiff and the defendant were married, the
plaintiff was granted a separation from bed and board based on aban-
donment. He agreed to an award of custody of his eighteen-month-old
daughter to the defendant. After a year and sixty days from the judg-
ment of separation, the defendant was awarded a divorce, but was de-
nied custody of her child after a showing that she had been living with
another man in the presence of the child for four months. Three months
later, after the defendant married her lover, she brought suit and was
granted custody by the trial court. The Third Circuit Court of Appeal
affirmed, and held that the mother was not required to meet the "double
burden" rule and that under the maternal preference rule she was enti-
tled to custody. Bushnell v. Bushnell, 348 So. 2d 1315 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1977).
Louisiana Civil Code articles 146 and 157 respectively control child
custody awards pending suit for separation or divorce l and after suit for
separation or divorce.2 Article 146 dictates that provisional custody
labeling of the proceeding as civil or criminal. A lynchpin of the Janis and Calandra
decisions of the Burger Court was that the purpose of deterrence for which the exclusionary
rule was formulated is not sufficiently enhanced to overcome the need to permit the intro-
duction of otherwise trustworthy evidence where the government's abuse of the seizure
power against a defendant would result merely in a civil penalty. On the whole, the view
espoused in One Plymouth Sedan is far less predictable but exceedingly more just. See
note 14, supra.
1. LA. CIv. CODE art. 146:
If there are children of the marriage, whose provisional keeping is claimed by both
husband and wife, the suit being yet pending and undecided, it shall be granted to the
wife, whether plaintiff or defendant; unless there should be strong reasons to deprive
her of it, either in whole or in part, the decision whereof is left to the discretion of the
judge.
2. LA. CIV. CODE art. 157 (as it appeared prior to its amendment by Act 48 of 1977):
In all cases of separation and of divorce the children shall be placed under the care of
the party who shall have obtained the separation or divorce unless the judge shall, for
the greater advantage of the children, order that some or all of them shall be entrusted
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pending suit should be awarded to the mother unless strong reasons exist
for not doing so. Before its amendment, article 157 directed judges to
grant custody to the party who obtained the separation or divorce unless,
for the advantage of the children, custody should be given to the other
party. A 1977 amendment to that article eliminated the reference to the
party obtaining the separation or divorce, making clear the paramount
importance placed on the child's interest.3 This amendment simply
codified the principle followed by practically all Louisiana courts in
child custody cases. However, in some instances, the courts have
reached decisions seemingly at odds with the child's best interest by us-
ing what is commonly known as the maternal preference rule.
The maternal preference rule has been articulated in many ways, 4
but generally stated the rule is that the best interest and welfare of the
child is served by granting custody to the mother. Thus, the maternal
preference rule is intended to serve as an aid to courts in determining the
best interest and welfare of the child, a factor which Louisiana5 and
other jurisdictions6 have long recognized as the paramount consideration
in awarding child custody.
The rule seems to have originated7 in the Louisiana jurisprudence
to the care of the other party. The party under whose care a child or children is
placed, or to whose care a child or children has been entrusted, shall of right become
natural tutor or tutrix of said child or children to the same extent and with the same
effect as if the other party had died.
3. 1977 La. Acts. No. 448. Article 157(A) now reads:
In all cases of separation and divorce, permanent custody of the child or children shall
be granted to the husband or the wife, in accordance with the best interest of the child
or children. Such custody hearing shall be held in private chambers of the judge. In
no event shall the pendente lite custody rights presently existing be affected by this
Act. The party under whose care the child or children is placed, or to whose care the
child or children has been entrusted, shall of right become natural tutor or tutrix of
said child or children to the same extent and with the same effect as if the other party
had died.
In passing this amendment, the intent of the legislature may have been to do away with the
maternal preference rule because the legislature could have easily written the rule into the
Act if it had wished to sanction its use. However, it can also be argued that had the
legislature wanted to discard the rule, it could have specifically done so.
4. Welch v. Welch, 307 So. 2d 737 (La. App. 2d Cit. 1975).
5. E.g., Messner v. Messner, 240 La. 252, 122 So. 2d 90 (1960); Drouin v. Hildenbrand,
235 La. 810, 105 So. 2d 532 (1958); Boatner v. Boatner, 235 La. 1, 102 So. 2d 472 (1958).
6. "In all matters where children are involved courts have said with tedious regularity
that the welfare of the child is the supreme goal to be obtained. No principle is more
untiringly recited." Drinan, The Rights of Children in Modern American Famil Law, 2 J.
FAM. L. 101, 103 (1962).
7. Comment, The Father's Right To Child Custody in Interparental Disputes, 49 TUL. L.
REV. 189, 192 (1974).
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with the cases of Black v. Black8 and White v. Broussard9 and since then
has become firmly established in Louisiana law.' 0 The cases reveal that
the maternal preference rule is so strong that the mother will not lose its
advantage even if she is guilty of adultery." However, the courts have
carefully marked the point beyond which the mother may not go and
still enjoy the benefits of the rule. For example, the father has been
awarded custody when the mother has adopted a highly emotional and
irrational method of disciplining the children, 12 or when the mother has
frequently entertained her paramour at home in the children's pres-
ence. ' 3 Thus, as a general rule, the father will be awarded custody when
the mother is guilty of open and public indiscretions in defiance of gen-
erally accepted moral principles and in disregard of the embarrassment
and injuries which might be sustained by the children.14 Nevertheless,
in some cases, Louisiana courts often seem to give more consideration to
the maternal preference rule than to the child's environmental stability. 15
Despite its strong judicial acceptance, the maternal preference rule
recently has been the object of severe criticism.' 6 One of the strongest
criticisms levelled against the rule is that although its premise may have
been valid at one time, it is simply no longer supportable in light of the
changing roles of married couples.' 7 In the past, few mothers were re-
8. 205 La. 861, 18 So. 2d 321 (1944).
9. 206 La. 25, 18 So. 2d 641 (1944).
10. E.g., Tiffee v. Tiffee, 254 La. 381, 223 So. 2d 840 (1969); Sharp v. Sharp, 228 La.
126, 81 So. 2d 833 (1955); Morrow v. Morrow, 218 So. 2d 393 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969).
11. Eg., Estopinal v. Estopinal, 223 La. 485, 66 So. 2d 311 (1953); LeGrand v.
LeGrand, 295 So. 2d 55 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974); Brown v. Brown, 180 So. 2d 106 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1965).
12. Nethken v. Nethken, 307 So. 2d 563 (La. 1975).
13. Tuggle v. Tuggle, 235 So. 2d 166 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970); Morris v. Morris, 152
So. 2d 291 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963).
14. Parker v. Parker, 304 So. 2d 681 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974).
15. See Estes v. Estes, 261 La. 20, 258 So. 2d 857 (1972); Nieto v. Nieto, 276 So. 2d
362 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973); Tullier v. Tullier, 140 So. 2d 916 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
16. "The assumption that, other things being equal, maternal custody was best, has
been justly criticized as incongruous with the best interest of the child theory and out of
touch with contemporary thought." Podell, Peck & First, Custod--To Which Parent, 56
MARQ. L. REV. 51, 52 (1972).
17. "If equal consideration were given to these emerging roles of the modern wife and
mother in our society, it might be discovered that the mother in a custody matter may no
longer be confined to traditional household and child rearing duties consistent with the
notion of motherhood." Walker, Measuring the Child's Best Interest-A Study of Incom-
plete Considerations, 44 DEN. L. 132, 139 (1976). "However, the urban family today is a
different unit, economically and sociologically, from its rural counterpart of one hundred
years ago. It can no longer be stated that a woman's sole occupation is to care for chil-
dren." Oster, Custody Proceedings: A Study of Vague and Indefinite Standards, 5 J. FAM.
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quired to work in order to meet the needs of their family, and thus were
able to spend more time at home with their children. The child, having
spent more time with its mother, would naturally develop a preference
for her. Generally, on divorce or separation, the interest and welfare of
the child were best served by granting custody to the mother. However,
in a society where more and more young mothers find it necessary or
useful to work to supplement the husband's income, the mother may
have no more time to spend with the child than the father.' 8 Applying
the maternal preference rule under these circumstances deprives the fa-
ther of his right to custody without serving the ostensible purpose of the
rule. In addition, many writers today agree that the rule was always
based more on traditional prejudices 19 than on scientific evidence. 20 If
these criticisms are valid, the maternal preference rule does not protect
the best interest of the child.
One of the most recent and perhaps most serious criticisms of the
rule is that it may be unconstitutional. 2' In Reed v. Reed,22 the United
States Supreme Court held that a provision of Iowa's probate statutes
was unconstitutional because it gave men preference over women as es-
tate administrators. According to the Court, such a preference violated
the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause by providing dissimi-
L. 21, 26 (1965). "Yet, when we investigate the reasons for the presumption in favor of
motherhood, we see that in today's society, it loses some of its validity." Behles & Behles,
Equal Rights In Divorce and Separation, 3 N.M. L. REV. 118, 132 (1973). See also Estes v.
Estes, 261 La. 20, 34, 258 So. 2d 857, 862 (1972) (Barham, J., dissenting).
18. Oster, Custody Proceedings- A Study of Vague and Indefinite Standards, 5 J. FAM.
L. 21, 28 (1965).
19. For example, it has been asserted that motherly love is a dominant trait in all
women which surpasses the paternal affection for the common offspring and that in gen-
eral, a child needs a mother's care even more than the father's. Freeland v. Freeland, 92
Wash. 482, 159 P. 698 (1916); see also Roth, The Tender Years Presumption In Child Cus-
tody Cases, 15 J. FAM. L. 423, 436 (1977).
20. "The assumption that the mother is a better custodian was and is wrong from an
historical, economic, sociological, and philosophical point of view." Podell, Peck & First,
Custody-To Which Parent, 56 MARQ. L. REV. 51, 53 (1972). "To define best interest in
terms of maternal custody not only forecloses further inquiry into a consideration of which
parent will best protect the child's welfare, but it also ignores the empirical data demon-
strating that 'mothering' is a function independent of the sex of the individual performing
it." Comment, The Tender Years Presumption: Do The Children Bear the Burden?, 21 S.D.
L. REV. 332, 334 (1976). "A considerable amount of research supports the proposition that
what a child needs during the 'tender' years is a certain quality of affectionate relationship
with someone in locoparentis and this can be provided by the father as well as the mother."
Roth, The Tender Years Presumption In Child Custody Cases, 15 J. FAM. L. 423, 449 (1977).
21. Comment, The Tender Years Presumption: Do The Children Bear The Burden, 21
S.D.L. REV. 332 (1976).
22. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
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lar treatment for men and women similarly situated.23 The approach
taken by the Court in Reed implied that some special sensitivity to sex as
a classifying factor entered into the analysis.24  In Frontiero v.
Richardson,25 a plurality of the Court concluded that "classifications
based on sex, like classifications based on race, alienage, or national ori-
gin are inherently suspect and must therefore be subjected to strict judi-
cial scrutiny."'26
Recent decisions of the Supreme Court, however, indicate that its
members disagree over the extent to which, if at all, sex is a suspect clas-
sification. Justice Douglas, who joined the plurality in Frontiero, al-
tered his position on the subject in Kahn v. Shevin 27 and seemed to
imply that where the classification based on sex is "benign"-Ze., dis-
criminates in favor of a class that has been and remains subject to dis-
crimination-such classification will not be subject to strict judicial
scrutiny.28 In dissenting opinions, Justices Brennan and Marshall ar-
gued that the Court should stand by the language in Frontiero without
reservation. However, in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,29 a case factually
similar to Frontiero, Justice Brennan's sub rosa strict scrutiny approach
was criticized by concurring opinions.30
The clearest statement of the test to be used concerning gender
based classifications was given in Craig v. Boren.3 1' There, Justice Bren-
nan, writing for the majority, said that to withstand constitutional chal-
lenge, classifications based on gender "must serve important
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achieve-
23. Id. at 74.
24. Gunther, Supreme Court 1971 Term, Foreword- In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: Model For a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1, 34 (1972).
25. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
26. Id. at 682.
27. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
28. In Kahn, the Court upheld a Florida statute which allowed widows a $500 prop-
erty tax exemption but provided no analogous exemption for widowers. Cf. Schlesinger v.
Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975), where the Court held that a statute requiring dismissal of
male naval officers who had not been promoted after nine years of active duty and of
female officers after thirteen years of active duty was not a denial of equal protection to
male officers. The Court noted that women officers did not have the same opportunities
for promotion as did their male counterparts.
29. 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
30. Id. at 654, 655. In Weinberger, the Court struck down a Social Security provision
which conferred payments based on the earnings of a deceased husband and father upon
his widow and minor children but which conferred payments based on the earnings of a
deceased wife and mother only upon her minor children since it was based on the assump-
tion that the earnings of male workers were vital while those of female workers were not.
31. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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ment of those objectives."'32 Although this standard does not represent a
strict scrutiny approach, it does represent an intermediate test 33 which is
more critical than the "minimum rationality" test used by the Court to
examine social welfare or economic legislation where the issue of disfa-
vored classifications is not involved.34
Recent cases indicate how the Supreme Court will apply the Boren
test. The statutes presented for review in Calfano v. Goldfarb35 and in
Califano v. Webster36 were similar in many ways.37 In Goldfarb, the
Court was faced with a Social Security Act provision whereby survivor's
benefits were payable to a widower only if he had been receiving at least
half of his support from his deceased wife, while such benefits based on
the earnings of a deceased husband were payable to his widow regardless
of dependency. The statute at issue in Webster was also a Social Secur-
ity provision which contained a federal formula for computation of
monthly old-age benefits. Application of the formula resulted in uni-
formly higher benefits for retired female wage earners than for males
similarly situated.
However, the Court upheld the Webster statute and struck down the
statute in Goldfarb. Apparently, the difference was that the Webster
statute served the permissible governmental objective of redressing soci-
ety's longstanding disparate treatment of women 38 while the Goldfarb
statute was based on "archaic and overbroad generalizations" because of
the assumption that wives are usually dependent.3 9 Thus, according to
one writer, the differential treatment of men and women is constitutional
only when it is demonstrable that the difference is not the accidental
consequence of a tradition-bound way of thinking about males and fe-
males, but is intentionally and reasonably designed to effect a needed
32. Id. at 197.
33. Id. at 210-228. Justice Powell concurred in the decision because he felt that under
the test of Reed P. Reed, the statute in Boren did not bear a fair and substantial relation to
the object of the legislation. Justice Stewart also concurred, apparently on the basis of
Reed. In dissenting opinions, Justices Burger and Rehnquist criticized the majority opin-
ion for applying an intermediate constitutional test to gender based classifications without
a constitutional basis for doing so.
34. A similar intermediate level of scrutiny has been used by the Court concerning the
rights of illegitimates. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Matthews v. Lucas,
427 U.S. 495 (1976).
35. 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
36. 430 U.S. 313 (1977).
37. Id. at 319.
38. Id.
39. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. at 211.
1978]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
remedy.40
Application of this standard to the maternal preference rule results
in the conclusion that the rule is an unconstitutional differentiation be-
tween males and females.4 1 It is doubtful that one could successfully
argue that the rule is not the result of a tradition-bound way of thinking
about males and females but is instead a method of effecting a needed
remedy in favor of women. Thus, under the Boren test, although serv-
ing the best interest of the child is without a doubt an important govern-
mental objective, socio-economic changes in the institution of the family,
as well as scientific evidence on the function of "mothering," point to the
conclusion that the maternal preference rule does not serve this objec-
tive.
Like the maternal preference rule, the double burden rule was
formed in an effort to protect the interest of the child in a custody dis-
pute.42 The rule was first enunciated in the case of Decker v. Landry43
and provides that the party seeking the modification of an initial custody
decree must prove that the conditions under which the child is living are
detrimental to his interests and that the petitioning party can and will
provide a good home and a better environment if he or she is given cus-
tody.44
The double burden rule is supported by important policy considera-
tions, not the least of which is the preservation of stability in the child's
environment. 45 Such stability has long been recognized as necessary to
40. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1070 (1978).
41. An obstacle in the way of declaring the rule unconstitutional is that the rule is not a
product of legislative action but is instead a judicially created presumption. This, how-
ever, has not prevented at least one court from declaring the rule unconstitutional. See
State ex rel. Watts v. Watts, 77 Misc. 2d 178, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1973). It
should be noted that a Louisiana court has recently held that the maternal preference rule
as applied under article 157 before its amendment does not violate article I, section 3 of the
Louisiana Constitution of 1974. See Broussard v. Broussard, 320 So. 2d 236 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1975). Also, three Pennsylvania justices have called the rule offensive to the concept
of equality of the sexes which that state has adopted as a constitutional principle through
the equal rights amendment. See Commonwealth ex ret Spriggs v. Carson, 470 Pa. 290,
368 A.2d 635 (1977).
42. Decker v. Landry, 227 La. 603, 80 So. 2d 91 (1955).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 604, 80 So. 2d at 92.
45. "Any psychiatrist or psychologist, experienced parent, grandparent, or teacher will
state that when there has already been one upheaval in the child's life due to divorce or
some other misfortune, the first and foremost requirement for the child's health and proper
growth is stability, security, and continuity." Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act- A Legislative Remedyfor Children Caught in the Conflict of Laws, 22
VAND. L. REv. 1207, 1208 (1969).
1102 [Vol. 38
the ordinary development of the child.46 Even if custody is initially
awarded to the less suitable parent, it may be better for the child to re-
main there than to be transferred from one parent to another.47 The
double burden rule also serves to prevent needless or extensive litigation
and continued bickering which can have damaging effects on both the
custodial parent and the child.48  Stability of the child's environment
and finality of the decree are so important that many writers suggest that
a time limit be set before the decree can be challenged,49 and then only
46. "A growing child's need for stability of environment and constancy of affection,
especially when subjected to the trauma of a disintegrated home seems today a well-ac-
cepted fact, verifying old truths gathered from long experiences of mankind." Id. at 1209.
"Ordinarily, the best psychological interests of the child require continuity and consistency
in the parent-child relationship." Foster, Adoption and Child Custody: Best Interests of the
Child?, 22 BUFF. L. Rav. 1, 12 (1972). "The most serious effect of these vacillating and
dilatory tactics is the effect they have on the children. As will be noted, one of the critical
aspects of a child's development is the need for stability in order to develop a sense of
identity. When a child is kept suspended, never quite knowing what will happen to him
next, he must likewise suspend the shaping of his personality. This is a devastating result
and probably represents one of the greatest risks which current procedures pose for chil-
dren." Watson, Children ofArmageddon. Problems of Child Custody Following Divorce, 21
SYRACUSE L. REV. 55, 64 (1969). "In the view of most child psychiatrists, stability of the
environment is far more crucial than its precise nature and content. The one thing with
which children have most difficulty coping is unpredictable variation, and this is especially
critical between the ages of two and adolescence." Id. at 71.
47. "If he is continuously being transferred from one parent to another by conflicting
court decrees, he may be a great deal worse off than if left with one parent, even though as
an original proposition some better provision could have been made for him."
Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. A Legislative Remedyfor Chil-
dren Caught in the Conflict ofLaws, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1207, 1209 (1969). "There is some
evidence that continuity of parental care may be more important to the child than the
individual attributes of the parent who provides care. ... Ellsworth & Levy, Legislative
Reform of Child Custody Adjudication, 4 LAW & Soc. REV. 167, 208 (1969). "Barring
neglect, a wrong but permanent decision probably serves the best interest of a child better
than a decision subject to continuous review, scrutiny, and a continuation of battles be-
tween the litigant parents." Greenbaum, In the Best Interest ofthe Child, 50 FLA. B.J. 532,
533 (1976).
48. "Another characteristic of current dispositional procedures which may be criticized
is the fact that any custodial disposition may be freely challenged and disrupted. This has
serious and detrimental effects on the custodian who must remain ever alert to defend
against such legal onslaughts. Parents lose spontaneity with their children when they feel
they must constantly anticipate the court's reaction to their activities with their children.
Since spontaneity in relationships between parents and children is highly important, the
end result of this situation is detrimental to the children. Of course there is also a high
economic cost to these ongoing defensive maneuvers." Watson, Children of Armageddor"
Problems of Custody Following Divorce, 21 SYRACUSE L. REV. 55, 63 (1969).
49. "Generally, post-decretal changes should be discouraged. The optimal situation
would be that there would not be post-decretal changes. Since this is unreal, there should
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under compelling circumstances. 50 However, one disadvantage of the
double burden rule is that it may force the non-custodial parent to attack
the custodial parent personally in court in order to prove that the child's
environment is deleterious to his welfare.
After Decker, it seemed as if most of the circuits would follow the
double burden rule.5 However, members of the Third Circuit were not
completely satisfied with the rule. The dissenting opinion of Judge
Hood in Gary v. Gary52 stated that the double burden rule should not be
used to prevent a mother from gaining custody of her children from their
father merely because the mother, at the time of the initial award, was
financially unable to care for the children. Apparently the dissent
would have allowed the mother to benefit from the maternal preference
rule and gain custody of the children even after the children had lived
with the father continuously for three years. A similar criticism was
voiced in a concurring opinion in Wells v. Wells.53 Judge Tate found
fault with the rule because it made it almost impossible for the mother to
regain custody of her children if a default judgment was rendered
against her because she was unable to afford a lawyer.54
Judge Tate reiterated this criticism in his concurrence in Craft v.
Craft.55 Its basis was simply that the double burden rule was a rigid
and inflexible rule which prevented the mother from exercising her ma-
ternal preference in certain situations. This criticism, however, is no
longer valid in light of the recent cases restricting the rule's application
be a specific minimal period of time before the court allows any question as to change of
custody. Three years seems to be a reasonable period of time barring emergencies."
Greenbaum, In the Best Interest of the Child, 50 FLA. B.J. 532, 535 (1976).
50. "A uniform act, therefore, should include a provision that specifically prohibits
modification petitions for a given period (one or two years at the least) following the initial
decree in the absence of a showing (by affidavit only) of extraordinary circumstances--e.g.,
that the child's physical health is seriously and immediately endangered by his present
circumstances." Ellsworth & Levy, Legislative Reform of Child Custody Adjudication, 4
LAW & Soc. REV. 167, 209 (1969).
51. Wells v. Wells, 180 So. 2d 580 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965); Poitevent v. Poitevent, 152
So. 2d 256 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963); Gary v. Gary, 143 So. 2d 411 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962);
Hanks v. Hanks, 138 So. 2d 19 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1962); Gentry v. Gentry, 136 So. 2d 418
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1961).
52. 143 So. 2d 411 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
53. 180 So. 2d 580 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
54. Id. at 583 (Tate, J., concurring). Judge Tate's opinion did not rest entirely upon
the maternal preference rule. An equal if not stronger basis for the decision was fairness to
the mother. Judge Tate could have been using the maternal preference rule in an attempt
to give the mother her day in court.
55. 184 So. 2d 758, 760 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966) (Tate, J., concurring).
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to situations where the original judgment was a considered decree. 56
Judge Tate later received another opportunity to write about the
rule, speaking this time for a majority of the Louisiana Supreme Court.
In Fulco v. Fulco,57 he attempted to clarify Louisiana custody law by
listing four of its major tenets.58 Instead of clarifying the law, however,
the ambiguous language of the decision has only led to conflicting opin-
ions over whether the court intended to discard the double burden rule.5 9
Cases from the Third Circuit in which the double burden issue has arisen
56. Lemons v. Lemons, 325 So. 2d 734 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976); Southern v. Southern,
308 So. 2d 424 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975); Swam v. Young, 311 So. 2d 617 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1975). A considered decree is a trial of the issue and a decision thereon applying pertinent
principles of law to the facts adduced. Gulino v. Gulino, 303 So. 2d 299 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1974). It seems that the essential ingredient of the considered decree is a proceeding at
which evidence is taken in regard to the parties' fitness to have the care, custody, and
control of the child or children. Stevens v. Stevens, 340 So. 2d 584 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1976); Partin v. Partin, 339 So. 2d 450 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976). Some courts have held that
the double burden rule does not apply when the award of custody is made to one party
based on the supervision of the child by third parties where both the mother and father
have abandoned their parental responsibility. DeCelle v. DeCelle, 313 So. 2d 634 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1975).
57. 259 La. 1122, 254 So. 2d 603 (1971).
58. In this regard, we believe the following legal principles areapplicable:
(1) The paramount consideration in determining to whom custody should be granted
is always the welfare of the children ...
(2) The general rule is that it is in the best interest of the children of the marriage to
grant custody to the mother, especially when they are of tender years. Such para-
mount right of the mother to custody should not be denied unless she is morally unfit
or otherwise unsuitable, and it is only in exceptional cases that the better interest of the
children is served by changing their custody from the mother to the father ...
(3) When the trial court has made a considered decree of permanent custody in the
light of the above principles, even though such custody is subject to modification at
any time when a change of conditions demands it, the party seeking the change bears a
heavy burden of proving that the continuation of the present custody is so deleterious
to the children as to justify removing them from the environment to which they are
accustomed. ...
(4) Upon appellate review, the determination of the trial judge in child custody mat-
ters is entitled to great weight. . . . His discretion on the issue will not be disturbed on
review in the absence of a clear showing of abuse thereof.
259 La. at 1127-29, 254 So. 2d at 605.
59. Although the Fulco decision neither specifically adopts nor discards the double
burden rule, the most reasonable interpretation of the decision seems to be that the first and
second principles are to apply only to initial custody proceedings and the third principle is
to apply to custody modification proceedings. Under the third principle, the person seek-
ing modification must prove that the child's environment is so detrimental that removal
from that environment to which the child may have become accustomed is justified. This
is the position taken by the dissent in Bushnell. 348 So. 2d at 1321 (Domengeaux, J.,
dissenting).
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since Fulco show that the judges are split in their opinions of Fulco's
effect on the rule. 60 The latest cases 61 from the Third Circuit, of which
the instant case is one, take the position that Fulco discarded the double
burden rule.
The decision in the instant case, just as other recent decisions, criti-
cized the double burden rule for its rigidity and inflexibility. The
Bushnell court took the position that the double burden rule had been
discarded by Fulco and allowed the mother who had once been deter-
mined unfit to use the maternal preference rule to gain custody of her
child from the father. The court found that the child's environment
with the father was in no way detrimental. However, the Bushnell court
reasoned that, based on the maternal preference rule, the mere separa-
tion of the child from its mother was a sufficiently detrimental factor to
justify placing the child in her custody.
In light of prior jurisprudence, the court cannot be faulted for rely-
ing so heavily on the maternal preference rule. As mentioned previ-
ously, it is one of the strongest presumptions in Louisiana law.
Furthermore, the determination of whether the rule is to apply in cus-
tody modification proceedings depends on one's interpretation of the
Fulco decision. However, the Bushnell court completely disregarded
the recent criticisms of the maternal preference rule; indeed, the court's
reliance on the rule, in light of the facts of the case, could very well result
in the bouncing back and forth of a child between parents "like a tennis
ball," in the words of Judge Domengeaux's dissenting opinion. 62 If the
courts are allowed to use the maternal preference rule without the limita-
tions placed on it by the double burden rule, situations similar to the one
in Bushnell are likely to become more and more common. Mothers,
encouraged by the formidable power of the maternal preference rule,
will not hesitate to sue for a change of custody when the risk of losing
has been minimized. This would be unfortunate, not only because the
stability of the child's environment is of paramount concern, but also
because the courts are already flooded with such litigation.
The conclusion by the Bushnell court that Fulco discarded the
double burden rule may not be entirely correct. According to Fulco, the
party seeking to change custody must bear a "heavy burden" of proving
"that the continuation of present custody is so deleterious to the child as
to justify removing him from the environment to which he has become
60. Grimes v. Johnson, 323 So. 2d 150 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975); Hebert v. Mestayer,
251 So. 2d 66 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971); King v. King, 245 So. 2d 560 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971).
61. See Bourque v. Leger, 322 So. 2d 784 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975).
62. 348 So. 2d at 1321 (Domengeaux, J., dissenting).
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accustomed." This "heavy burden" looks very much like the first step of
the double burden, and it can be assumed that the courts will refuse to
change custody unless the petitioning party can also provide a better en-
vironment. Therefore, it can reasonably be said that to this extent,
Fulco did not discard the double burden rule.63
Bushnell serves to illustrate the danger involved when the courts
attempt to decide important issues with the use of unfounded presump-
tions and rigidly applied rules. We should recognize from the jurispru-
dence that there are no short cuts in child custody cases. The best
interest of the child cannot be consistently obtained through the strict
application of rules. The double burden rule and the maternal prefer-
ence rule should be discarded 64 in favor of specifically worded guidelines
which would enable the courts to weigh and balance those factors which
most often affect the determination of child custody cases. 65 These
guidelines could be incorporated into legislation, or the supreme court,
as it attempted to in Fulco, could list these guidelines to be followed by
the courts.
Such guidelines could be used in provisional custody proceedings,
permanent custody proceedings, and in proceedings to modify custody.
These guidelines would also allow a party to predict within reason
whether his case is strong enough to obtain custody. Furthermore, if
such guidelines include consideration of the amount of time the child has
lived in a stable environment, then the parties will be reluctant to enter
useless proceedings when one party has had custody for a prolonged pe-
riod of time.66
63. The court in the instant case seems to have ignored the language in Fulco which
seemed to specify what the "heavy burden" was.
64. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(2)(b) (West Supp. 1977): "The court shall award custody
and visitation rights of minor children of the parties as a part of proceeding for dissolution
of marriage in accordance with the best interests of the child and in accordance with the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. Upon considering all relevant factors, the father
of the child shall be given the same consideration as the mother in determining custody."
See also Wis. STAT. ANN. § 247.24(3) (West Supp. 1978): "In determining the parent with
whom a child shall remain, the court shall consider all facts in the best interest of the child
and shall not prefer one parent over the other solely on the basis of the sex of the parent."
65. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13 (West Supp. 1977); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 25.312(3) (Supp.
1974); See also UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 402 (1970).
66. "It has been asserted that a third of all divorces involving children are followed by
further litigation regarding them, and if such is the case, obviously the law with regard to
modification is largely responsible." Freed & Foster, The Shuffled Child and Divorce
Court, 10 TRIAL 26, 34 (1974); See also Freed & Foster, Child Custody Part 11, 39
N.Y.U.L. REv. 615 (1964).
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Another advantage of a precisely worded set of guidelines would be
that they would take the focus of the courts away from the fitness of the
parties and place it where it should be, on the best interest of the child.
This would also prevent the petitioning parent from being forced to
prove the other's unfitness. Louisiana courts should also follow the lead
taken by other courts in further employing the services of experts in the
field of human behavior in order to determine more realistically what is
in fact the child's best interest. 6
7
Furthermore, the guidelines would resolve the bickering 68 between
the circuits involving the application of the maternal preference and the
double burden rules. Although the conflict may simply be a matter of
semantics, as one judge has suggested,69 its final determination would
permit the courts to deal more completely with each individual child's
best interest, with no need to take sides in a controversy over jurispru-
dential interpretation.
Decisions concerning child custody are perhaps the most difficult
that a judge must make.70 However, the job should not be made easier
by mechanically applied formulas which sacrifice the best interest of the
child to judicial economy. With so much at stake, the courts can ill
afford to make decisions based on out-of-date presumptions and inflexi-
ble rules.
Samuel N Poole, Jr.
HOME RULE AND LOCAL ORDINANCES DEFINING GAMBLING
Defendant was convicted in Shreveport city court of violating a mu-
67. "[I]t seems clear that the trend particularly among the more enlightened courts is to
ignore the rigid absolutes and legalisms of the past and adhere with increasing frequency to
the trend toward reliance on the social scientists and expert testimony of psychologists,
psychiatrists, social investigators and other experts in the field of human behavior."
Podell, Peck & First, Custody-To Which Parent, 56 MARQ. L. REV. 51, 68 (1972).
68. There are no signs that the circuits are coming closer to an agreement concerning
the use of the double burden rule. In fact, the very opposite seems to be the state of affairs
at this time. See Languirand v. Languirand, 350 So. 2d 973 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977).
69. Bushnell v. Bushnell, 348 So. 2d at 1322 (Domengeaux, J., dissenting).
70. "[A] judge agonizes more about reaching the right result in a contested custody
issue than about any other type of decision he renders." B. BOTEIN, TRIAL JUDGE 273
(1952).
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